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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case  
 Scott Alan Moore appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion to modify his felony conviction for aiding and abetting a 
robbery to a misdemeanor.     
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 In February 2003, Moore pled guilty to aiding and abetting a robbery.  
(#42405 R., pp.41-46.1)  The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence 
with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for 180 days.  (#42405 R., pp.54-
57.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended 
Moore’s sentence and placed him on probation for five years.  (#42405 R., pp.65-
70.)    
 In May 2014, Moore moved the district court to amend his felony robbery 
conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(3).  (#42405 R., pp.77-
79.) The prosecutor objected to the motion.  (See #42405 R., p.81.)  The district 
court then denied the motion, concluding that the language of I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
precluded it from amending Moore’s judgment of conviction without the 
stipulation of the prosecutor.  (#42405 R., pp.81-82.)   
 For the first time on appeal, Moore argued that the prosecutor stipulation 
requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) violated the separation of powers provision of 
the Idaho Constitution and the equal protection provisions of both the Idaho and 
                                                          
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Moore’s motion to take judicial notice of the 




United States Constitutions.  See State v. Moore, 158 Idaho 943, 354 P.3d 505 
(Ct. App. 2015).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of 
Moore’s  I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion, holding that Moore waved his constitutional 
arguments by failing to raise them below, and that fundamental error analysis 
was not applicable to Moore’s attempt to vindicate an alleged statutory right.  Id. 
 Two months later, Moore filed a second I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion to 
amend his 2003 felony conviction to a misdemeanor.  (R., pp.16-18.)  The 
prosecutor again objected to the motion.  (R., pp.25-26.)  This time, in response 
to the state’s objection, Moore argued that the prosecutor stipulation requirement 
of I.C. § 19-2604(3) violated the separation of powers provision of the Idaho 
Constitution, the due process clause of the United States Constitution, and  the 
equal protection provisions of both the Idaho and United States Constitutions.  
(R., pp.32-49.)  The district court denied the motion, again concluding that the 
language of I.C. § 19-2604(3) precluded it from amending Moore’s judgment of 
conviction without the stipulation of the prosecutor.  (R., pp.62-73.)  The court 
also rejected Moore’s constitutional arguments.  (Id.)  Moore timely appealed.  





 Moore states the issues on appeal as:  
 
1. Did the District Court err in ruling that § 19-2604’s 
prosecutorial stipulation requirement does not violate Idaho’s 
separation of powers doctrine? 
 
2. Did the District Court err in ruling that § 19-2604’s 
prosecutorial stipulation requirement does not violate Mr. 
Moore’s right to procedural due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? 
 
3. Did the District Court err in ruling that § 19-2604’s 
prosecutorial stipulation requirement does not violate Mr. 
Moore’s right to equal protection guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.3) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his 
argument that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the separation of powers 
provision of the Idaho Constitution?  
 
2. Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his 
argument that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution?  
 
3. Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his 
argument that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the equal protection provisions of 


















Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Rejecting His 
Argument That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Separation Of Powers Provision 
Of The Idaho Constitution 
 
A. Introduction 
Moore contends that the district court erred in rejecting his argument that 
the prosecutor stipulation requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the 
separation of powers provision of the Idaho Constitution.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-
12.)  Moore’s argument fails because I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not deprive the 
judicial branch of any inherent or constitutional power that rightly pertains to it. 
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
 Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo.  State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003).  The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute.  Id.  The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality.  Id.   
 
C. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Does Not Deprive The Judiciary Of Any Of Its 
Inherent Or Constitutional Powers 
 
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution distributes power to the three 
distinct departments of government, and provides that “no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 




except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.”  Article V, § 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution specifically prohibits the legislature from “depriv[ing] the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it.”   
Idaho Code § 19-2604 permits individuals to petition the district court, in 
certain prescribed circumstances, to set aside their conviction, commute their 
sentence, or amend their felony judgment of conviction to a misdemeanor.  In 
2013, the legislature amended I.C. § 19-2604(3) and expanded the applicability 
of available relief under that subsection as follows:  
(3) (a) In addition to the circumstances in which relief from a felony 
conviction may be granted under subsections (1) and (2) of this 
section, a defendant who has been convicted of a felony and who 
has been discharged from probation may apply to the sentencing 
court for a reduction of the conviction from a felony to a 
misdemeanor as provided in this subsection. 
 
(b)  If less than five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant’s 
discharge from probation, the application may be granted only if the 
prosecuting attorney stipulates to the reduction. 
 
(c)  If at least five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant’s 
discharge from probation, and if the defendant was convicted of 
any of the following offenses, the application may be granted only if 
the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the reduction: [List of 
applicable offenses, including robbery, I.C. § 18-6501].   
 
(d) The decision as to whether to grant such an application shall be 
in the discretion of the district court, provided that the application 
may be granted only if the court finds that: 
 
(i)  The defendant has not been convicted of any 
felony  committed after the conviction from which relief 
is sought; 
 
(ii)  The defendant is not currently charged with any 
crime; 
 





(iv)  In those cases where the stipulation of the 
prosecuting attorney is required under paragraph (b) or  
(c) of this subsection, the prosecuting attorney has so 
stipulated. 
 
(e)  If the court grants the application, the court shall reduce the 
felony conviction to a misdemeanor and amend the judgment of 
conviction for a term in the custody of the state board of correction 
to “confinement in a penal facility” for the number of days served 
prior to the judgment of conviction. 
 
S.L. 2013, ch. 256, § 1, eff. July 1, 2013. 
 
 Therefore, following the effective date of this amendment to the statute, 
individuals convicted of robbery may, upon their discharge from probation, 
petition the district court to amend their conviction to a misdemeanor.  I.C. § 19-
2604(3).  However, the district court may exercise its discretion and consider 
such a request only if the prosecutor stipulates to the reduction.  Id.   
In this case, Moore contends that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the separation 
of powers provisions of the Idaho Constitution because it unconstitutionally 
delegates judicial powers to the prosecutor by limiting relief to those defendants 
with whom the prosecuting attorney stipulates to relief.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-
12.)  Moore’s assertion fails.  
As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.65-68), Idaho Code § 19-
2604(3) does not deprive the judicial department of any inherent or constitutional 
power.  The judicial department does not have the inherent or constitutional 
power to reduce felony convictions years after a defendant is discharged from 
probation.  Indeed, to the contrary, it is well-settled in Idaho that a district court 
has no jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment once the judgment becomes 




appeal, unless a statute or rule extends its jurisdiction.  State v. Jakoski, 139 
Idaho 352, 354, 79 P.2d 711, 713 (2003).     
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) is such a statute that grants a district court the 
jurisdiction to amend an otherwise final judgment.  The district court would not 
have this power absent this statute.  Therefore, I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not 
“deprive” the district court of any power that “rightly pertains” to the judiciary.  The 
subsection instead merely attaches conditions precedent, including the 
stipulation of the prosecutor, to the grant of the statutory power.   
Recently, in State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 110-112, 343 P.3d 1110, 1117-
1119 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that the legislature does not 
violate constitutional separation of powers provisions when it grants post-
judgment sentence modification powers to the executive branch.  In Thiel, the 
Court analyzed I.C. § 20-621, which provides that any person serving a county 
jail sentence is entitled to good-time credit upon the recommendation of the 
sheriff.  Id. at 105-112, 343 P.3d at 1112-1119.  The Court first held that, 
pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a sheriff’s recommendation for 
good-time credit is binding upon the trial court.  Id. at 107-110, 343 P.3d at 1114-
1117.    
The Court then held that I.C. § 20-621 does not violate the separation of 
powers provision of the Idaho Constitution because it does not deprive the 
judiciary of powers that properly belong to it.   Id. at 110-112, 343 P.3d at 1117-
1119.  The Court recognized that while the judiciary “has constitutionally 




similar authority “in the period following the entry of judgment.”  Id. at 110-111, 
343 P.3d at 1117-1118 (citing Spanton v. Clapp, 78 Idaho 234, 238, 299 P.2d 
1103, 1104 (1956)).  Next, the Court noted that the executive branch “wields the 
power to pardon and commute sentences,” and that the sheriff’s binding statutory 
authority to recommend good-time credit is consistent with this power.  Id. at 111, 
343 P.3d at 1118.  Finally, the Court recognized that the “early release scheme” 
of I.C. § 20-621 “can be construed as falling within the legislature’s power to fix 
punishment.”  Id. (citing Malloroy v. State, 91 Idaho 914, 915, 435 P.2d 254, 255 
(1967)).  The Court summarized: 
The legislature has the constitutional authority to identify and 
define criminal acts, as well as the power to prescribe penalties for 
these crimes.  If it has the power to do these things, it surely has 
the power to enact a targeted early-release scheme to lessen the 
penalties for these crimes. Furthermore, the legislature has the 
authority to delegate the good-behavior determination to an 




 The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Thiel compels a similar conclusion 
in the present case.  As discussed above, the judiciary has no inherent or 
constitutional authority to modify a defendant’s felony conviction to a 
misdemeanor after the conviction has become final.  Further, the power granted 
by I.C. § 19-2604(3) permitting prosecutors to veto charge reductions requested 
by defendants who were convicted of certain violent felonies is consistent with 
the executive branch’s power to commute sentences.  Finally, I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
can also be construed as falling within the legislature’s power to identify and 




On appeal, Moore attempts to distinguish Thiel on the ground that in that 
case, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the judicial branch has the 
inherent or constitutional authority to modify a sentence after a judgment of 
conviction becomes final, while the present case concerns whether the judicial 
branch has the inherent or constitutional authority to modify a judgment of 
conviction after the initial judgment of conviction becomes final.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.11-12.)  This is a distinction without a difference because the judiciary 
possesses neither power independent of the legislature granting it through 
statutes.  While the judiciary clearly has the inherent and common law authority 
to enter the initial judgment of conviction following a guilty plea or verdict, 
I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not deprive the judiciary of this authority, or delegate this 
authority to any other branch of government.  Instead, I.C. § 19-2604(3) merely 
applies conditions to the district court’s statutory post-judgment power to modify 
a judgment of conviction that has become final – a power which, as discussed 
above, the judiciary does not possess absent I.C. § 19-2604(3).  Moore has 
therefore failed to show that Thiel is distinguishable from the facts of the present 
case.     
Below and on appeal, Moore also cites State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 
P.2d 247 (1971), in which the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that a 
legislatively-established mandatory minimum sentencing scheme violated the 




judiciary of its power, established at common law, to suspend a sentence.2  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7; R., pp.39-40.) However, McCoy is plainly 
distinguishable from the present case.  As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in 
Thiel with respect to I.C. § 20-621: 
The facts presented in this case are not the same as those 
in McCoy.  The Court’s holding in McCoy was premised on courts 
possessing, at common law, the power to suspend a sentence. 
However, a suspension is not the same as a commutation. For 
one, “[a] commutation diminishes the severity of a sentence, e.g. 
shortens the term of punishment,” while a suspension delays the 
entry of a sentence.  Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849, 852, 538 
P.2d 778, 781 (1975).  More importantly, whereas the authority to 
suspend a sentence rests with the judiciary at common law, courts 
do not similarly possess the power at common law to commute a 
sentence.  A commutation is inherently a creature of the executive 
branch.  
 
Thiel, 158 Idaho at 111, 343 P.3d at 1118.  The facts of the present case are 
similarly distinguishable from McCoy.  Likewise, other cases relied upon by 
Moore, such as People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564 (Cal. 2005); People v. Tenorio, 
473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970), and Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 
1971) (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8), in which statutes were deemed to violate 
constitutional separation of powers provisions, similarly pertain, as in McCoy, 
only to the divesting of a trial court’s pre-judgment authority over criminal cases.  
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not unconstitutionally divest power of the 
judiciary to the executive branch.  Moore has therefore failed to demonstrate that 
the district court erred in denying his motion to reduce his felony conviction to a 
misdemeanor.     
                                                          
2 An amendment to the Idaho Constitution later expressly granted the legislature 
the power to enact mandatory minimum sentences that would limit a trial court’s 





Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Rejecting His 
Argument That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Due Process Clause Of The 
United States Constitution 
 
A. Introduction 
Moore contends that the district court erred in concluding that the 
prosecutor stipulation requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not violate the due 
process clause of the United States Constitution.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)  
This argument fails because Moore had no liberty interest in his felony conviction 
being reduced to a misdemeanor.    
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
 Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo.  Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131.  The party 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome a strong 
presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute.  Id.  
The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute that upholds 
its constitutionality.  Id.   
 
C. The Prosecutor Stipulation Requirement Of I.C. § 19-2604(3) Does Not 
Violate The Due Process Clause Of The United States Constitution 
 
“The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process 
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”  State v. 
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010).  However, before 




interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 
575, 930 P.2d 603, 605 (1996).   
The mere hope that a sentence will be reduced or its execution 
suspended is not a recognized liberty interest.  See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 
138, 141-142, 30 P.3d 293, 296-297 (2001).  When the state has not “given 
back” a liberty interest that was taken from a defendant at sentencing, “no due 
process is necessary to continue the denial of the liberty interest.”  Id. (citing 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 
(1979)); see also Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-143, 30 P.3d at 297-298 
(distinguishing relinquishment of jurisdiction, which does not require due process 
because there is no liberty interest, from revocation of probation, which does 
require due process because a liberty interest is being lost). 
A state statute may create a liberty interest which implicates constitutional 
due process.  The United States Supreme Court enunciated the following test to 
determine whether a liberty interest was created by state statutes or regulations: 
Stated simply, ‘a State creates a protected liberty interest by 
placing substantive limitations on official discretion.’ [Citation 
omitted.]  A State may do this in a number of ways.  Neither the 
drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an 
exact science.  Our past decisions suggest, however, that the most 
common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by 
establishing ‘substantive predicates' to govern official decision 
making, [citation omitted] and, further, by mandating the outcome to 
be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.  
 
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989). 
 
In this case, as the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.64-65), 




the constitutional due process clause was not implicated.  Moore was not 
deprived of any benefit that he already possessed.  Instead, Moore possessed 
only a “mere hope” that the prosecutor would stipulate to his request that the 
district court reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor, and that the district 
court would then exercise its discretion to grant the request.  Further, I.C. § 19-
2604 does not mandate charge reduction upon a finding that relevant criteria 
have been met.   The statute instead permits modification, expressly pursuant to 
the discretion of the trial court, and upon the stipulation of the prosecutor, who is 
likewise not bound to grant such a stipulation under any particular circumstances.   
Moore has failed to demonstrate that he possessed a liberty interest that 
implicated the constitutional due process clause.  He has therefore failed to 
demonstrate that the district court erred by rejecting his constitutional due 
process argument.   
 
III. 
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Rejecting His 
Argument That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Equal Protection Provisions Of 
The Idaho And United States Constitutions 
 
A. Introduction 
Moore contends that the district court erred in concluding that the 
prosecutor stipulation requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not violate the equal 
protection provisions of the Idaho and United States Constitutions.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.13-16.)  Moore has failed to meet his initial burden to demonstrate that 
he was treated differently by virtue of some classification between himself and 




demonstrate that the district court erred in concluding that the legislature’s 
decision to distinguish between individuals convicted of certain violent felonies 
and individuals convicted of lesser felonies was not rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose.  
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
 Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo.  Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131.  The party 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome a strong 
presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute.  Id.  
The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute that upholds 
its constitutionality.  Id.   
 
C. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Does Not Violate The Equal Protection Clause 
Of Either The Idaho Or United States Constitutions 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should 
be treated alike.  State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Ct. 
App. 2014). 
The “first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify the 
classification at issue.”  Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho 193, 198, 307 P.3d 
1219, 1224 (2013) (internal quotes and citations omitted).  Where a party 
claiming an equal protection violation has failed to identify a valid classification, 




not supported by argument or authority.”  Id.  The second step is to articulate the 
standard under which the classification will be tested.  State v. Mowrey, 134 
Idaho 751, 754, 9 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2000).  In Mowrey, the Idaho Supreme Court 
described the equal protection standards as follows: 
When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny 
applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate 
scrutiny applies to classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; 
and rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges.  For 
analyses made under the Idaho Constitution, slightly different levels 
of scrutiny apply.  Strict scrutiny, as under federal law, applies to 
fundamental rights and suspect classes.  Means-focus scrutiny, 
unlike the federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed “where the 
discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification is 
apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a 
lack of relationship between the classification and the declared 
purpose of the statute.” 
 
Id. at 754-755, 9 P.3d at 1220-1221. 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also described the “means-focus scrutiny” 
standard as being applicable where the challenged classification is “obviously 
invidiously discriminatory,” which requires the statute to “distinguish between 
individuals or groups either odiously or on some other basis calculated to excite 
animosity or ill will.”  McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 
814, 135 P.3d 756, 760 (2006) (quoting Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560, 
569, 38 P.3d 598, 607 (2001)).  
In this case, Moore asserts that the prosecutor stipulation requirement of 
I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the equal protection clauses of the Idaho and United 
States Constitutions by treating individuals who have committed certain 
enumerated violent felonies differently than those who have committed less 




Moore argues that the district court erred in two respects.  First, he 
contends that the district court erred by applying the rational basis test to analyze 
the relevant classification rather than the “means-focus scrutiny” test specific to 
the Idaho Constitution.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.)  Second, Moore contends 
that regardless of which test is applicable, the district court erred in concluding 
that the statute’s classification did not violate the equal protection clauses of the 
Idaho and United States Constitutions.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  Moore has 
failed to show that the district court erred.   
First, Moore has failed to meet his initial burden to demonstrate that he 
was treated differently by virtue of some classification.  An individual convicted of 
one of the felonies enumerated in I.C. § 19-2604(3) is not “similarly situated,” for 
equal protection purposes, to an individual who was convicted of some other 
felony.  Those two individuals are guilty of different crimes, are culpable for the 
commission of those different crimes, and are subject to the separate penalties 
and post-judgment charge reduction opportunities associated with those crimes.  
Moore’s equal protection challenge therefore fails.3  See, e.g., State v. Rawlings, 
159 Idaho 498, ___, 363 P.3d 339, 343 (2015) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge to classification drawn by the legislature in enacting criminal statute).  
Further, even if Moore identified a classification subject to further equal 
protection analysis, he has failed to show that the district court erred.  First, the 
district court correctly analyzed Moore’s equal protection claim under the rational 
                                                          
3 While the district court rejected Moore’s equal protection challenge after 
applying the rational basis standard (R., pp.65-68), this Court may affirm the 
district court’s order on any correct legal theory.  See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129 




basis test.  The stated purpose of the relevant 2013 amendment to I.C. § 19-
2604(3) is “to allow courts to reduce felony convictions to misdemeanors and 
amend judgments of conviction in certain circumstances.”  Statement of Purpose, 
RS 22199, S.B. 1151 (2013). There is no “patent indication” of a lack of 
relationship between this stated purpose and classifying those who have 
committed certain violent felonies differently than those who have committed less 
serious felonies with respect to charge reduction requests.  Further, this 
classification does not “distinguish between individuals or groups either odiously 
or on some other basis calculated to excited animosity or ill will.”  Therefore, 
“means-focus scrutiny” in inapplicable to this case. 
The district court also correctly concluded that the challenged 
classification passed the constitutional rational basis scrutiny test.  (R., pp.65-
68.)  Under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, a classification will 
pass rational basis scrutiny if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose and “if there is any conceivable state of facts which will support it.”  
Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 262, 954 P.2d 676, 680 (1998) 
(quoting Bint v. Creative Forest Prods., 108 Idaho 116, 120, 697 P.2d 818, 822 
(1985)).   
The state has a legitimate state interest in imposing criminal punishment, 
protecting the community from criminals, and deterring criminal conduct.  See 
Mowrey, 134 Idaho at 755, 9 P.3d at 1221; State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 610, 
167 P.3d 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106, 233 




the legislature to distinguish those convicted of certain violent felony crimes, such 
as robbery, from those convicted of less serious felonies.  This is true in the 
contexts of both criminal punishment, and post-judgment opportunities for 
sentence modification or charge reduction.   
In Mowrey, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a similar equal protection 
challenge made to the version of I.C. § 19-2604 which was in effect at the time.  
Mowrey, 134 Idaho at 754-756, 9 P.3d at 1220-1222.  Mowrey argued that 
I.C. § 19-2604 unconstitutionality discriminated against individuals who had been 
convicted of certain sexual offenses against minors because it allowed 
individuals convicted of certain other sexual offenses against minors to have their 
convictions be reduced to misdemeanors.  Id.  Applying the rational basis 
standard, the Court concluded that the classification was rationally related to 
legitimate state interests of protecting children and increasing the penalties for 
certain sexual crimes against children.  Id.  The Court further recognized that the 
fact that the charge modification opportunity of I.C. § 19-2604 “did not cover 
every conceivable statute under which a person could be convicted of such acts” 
did not diminish this rational relationship.   Id.   Similarly, the equal protection 
clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions do not prohibit the state 
legislature from imposing the I.C. § 19-2604(3) prosecutor stipulation 
requirement only upon those individuals convicted of certain violent felonies.  
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not violate the equal protection clauses of 
the Idaho or United States Constitutions.  Moore has therefore failed to 








 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Moore’s I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion to amend the judgment of 
conviction entered upon his guilty plea to aiding and abetting a robbery.    




       /s/ Mark W. Olson__________________ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
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